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This paper constructs a unique cohort data set to study the changes since 
1960 in the share of Americans' resources that are annuitized.  Understanding 
these changes is important because the larger this share,  the more cohorts are 
likely to consume and the less they are likely to bequeath.  Hence, the degree 
of annuitization affects national saving as well as the transmission of 
inequality over time. 
Our findings are striking.  Although the annuitized share of resources of 
younger Americans declined slightly between 1960 and 1990,  it increased 
dramatically for older Americans (those age 65 or more).  It doubled for older 
men and quadrupled for older women.  Since the elderly have much higher 
mortality probabilities than do the young,  their degree of annuitization is 
much more important for aggregate bequests and saving.  According to our 
estimates, aggregate U.S.  bequests would now be almost 50  percent larger had 
the post-1960  increase in annuitization not occurred.  In  addition,  U.S. 
national saving would likely be substantially larger than is currently the 
case. 
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This paper constructs a unique cohort data set to examine changes since 
1960 in the share of Americansf resources that are annuitized (cannot be 
bequeathed).  Understanding these changes is important.  Generations whose 
resources are more annuitized will consume more and bequeath less to their 
children and others.'  This has implications for national saving as well as 
the intergenerational transmission of inequality. 
Auerbach, Kotlikoff,  and Weil (1992) report dramatic increases between 
1962 and 1983 in the annuitization of elderly Americansf  resources.  Their 
study relies on two cross-section surveys,  the 1962 and 1983 Surveys of 
Consumer Finances.  The nature of these data forced the authors to impute many 
of the future annuity streams available to survey respondents,  including labor 
earnings, Social Security benefits,  and private pension income,  and to exclude 
from the analysis the large medical annuities provided by Medicare and 
Medicaid. 
This study takes a different approach.  Rather than estimate the 
annuities of individual households, it considers the annuities of individual 
cohorts alive between 1960 and 1990.  Specifically,  it uses cross-section 
surveys to distribute to cohorts annual aggregate flows of income reported in 
the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) and other sources.  Although 
this approach cannot address the interesting intracohort distribution issues 
considered in Auerbach et al. (1993),  it offers a potentially more accurate 
and comprehensive method of assessing the overall degree of annuitization 
among Americans. 
Our findings are striking.  Across all American males, the annuitized 
share of resources remained roughly constant between 1960 and 1990.  For 
'1n  this paper, the word "generation"  refers to persons of a given sex 
born in the same year. 
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(age 65 and over),  the annuitized resource share rose from 22 to 45  percent 
for men and from 12 to 47  percent for women.  Without this increase in the 
degree of annuitization,  U.S. aggregate bequests would be an estimated 47 
percent larger.  That is,  if the government were to alter the structure of 
Social Security benefits so as to return the degree of annuitization to its 
1960 level,  aggregate bequests would be almost 50 percent larger than current 
levels.  Although the precise i~pact  ex the consq&i;,ption  of the elderly of 
their increased annuitization is unclear,  it appears to be substantial. 
Indeed,  it appears capable of explaining a significant fraction of the decline 
in U.S. national saving. 
Section I1 provides some background to this study.  It defines annuitized 
and nonannuitized resources,  considers some general indicators of the increase 
in annuitization,  and discusses how increased annuitization  can affect 
national saving.  Section I11 outlines the methods used for estimating the 
annuitized and nonannuitized components of resources.  Section IV describes 
our data sources.  Section  V presents our findings and explores their implica- 
tions.  Finally,  Section VI summarizes the results and draws conclusions. 
11. Background 
Annuities are income flows that are contingent upon their owner's 
survival.  Examples include Social Security benefits,  private and public 
pension benefits,  government-provided health-care benefits,  and labor 
earnings.  Government transfer payments in the form of Social Security, 
Some annuities are contingent on other factors as well, such as the 
need for medical services. 
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annuities.  These transfer payments have grown from less than 1 percent of GDP 
in the mid-1950s  to over 9 percent today.  Pension  benefits have also 
increased faster than GDP.  While pensions totaled 1.7  percent of GDP in 1960, 
they now total more than 5.4  percent. 
Not all annuities are positive.  Future tax payments are examples of 
negative annuities.  In recent decades,  U.S. taxes have also grown relative to 
GDP.  Another factor that has lowered annuitization is the reduction in 
annuitized labor income associated with the trend toward early retirement.  In 
1960,  33.1  percent of elderly males (those age 65 or more) and 10.8 percent of 
elderly females participated in the labor force.  The corresponding 1992 
percentages are 16.1  and 8.3  percent. 
The public can also reduce its effective degree of annuitization by 
purchasing life insurance.  As Yaari (1965) pointed out,  the purchase  of life 
insurance is equivalent to the sale of an annuity.  Cohorts that do not offset 
increases in their annuitization through increased life insurance purchase are 
likely to bequeath less and consume more than would otherwise be the case. 
Davies (1981),  Abel (1985),  and Kotlikoff et al. (1986) present simulations of 
the effects of introducing annuities into life-cycle economies.  In their 
models,  agents have no bequest motive and,  consequently,  do not offset 
increased annuitization  by buying more life insurance.  The ability to trans- 
form their net worth (or to have it transformed) into annuities permits these 
agents to stop worrying about outliving their resources when they are old and 
to consume more.  Each of these studies suggests that a significant increase 
in annuitization will be associated with a substantial decline in both 
national saving and aggregate bequests, as well as a significant increase in 
the relative consumption-of  the elderly. 
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below,  has coincided with both a dramatic decline in national saving and a 
dramatic increase in the relative consumption of the elderly.  Since 1980,  the 
U.S.  net national saving rate has averaged 4.1  percent, compared with 9.1 
percent in the 1950s and 1960s,  and 8.5  percent in the 1970s.  In this decade, 
the net national saving rate has averaged only 2.5 percent.  A comparison of 
the 1960-61, 1972-73, 1984-86, and 1987-90 BLS Consumer Expenditure Surveys 
shows an equally remarkable rise in elderly persons' relative consumption. 
Figure 1 presents indices of average consumption by age for each of the four 
periods.3  For each period, the average consumption  of 40-year-olds  is norrnal- 
ized to 1. 
As the figure indicates,  the age-consumption profiles for later years are 
tilted upward compared to those for earlier years, indicating a rise over time 
in the relative consumption of the elderly.  Table 1 reports the ratios of 
average levels of consumption  of 70-year-old males and females to those of 30- 
year-old males and females for each of the four periods.  It shows that 70- 
year-olds in 1960 consumed about two-thirds the amount consumed by 30-year- 
olds in 1960,  whereas their consumption now exceeds that of 30-year-olds. 
The increase in the annuitization of the elderly is certainly not the 
only,  nor necessarily the most important, explanation for the increase in 
The source for this figure as well as for table 1 is Gokhale, 
Kotlikoff, and Sabelhaus (1994).  Their study describes their method of 
allocating household consumption to the adults residing in the households 
interviewed in the various Consumer Expenditure Surveys.  It also describes 
their methods of allocating by age and sex those components of  household 
consumption expenditure included in the National Income and Product Accounts 
but excluded from the Consumer Expenditure Surveys.  Examples of such 
components include imputed rent and medical care.  The calculated average 
values of consumption by age and sex used in this figure and in table 1 are 
benchmarked on a component-by-component basis against the National Income 
Accounts totals of household expenditures for the various years in question. 
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Indeed,  much of the explanation for these outcomes appears to lie in the 
government's massive transfers to the elderly,  which have raised their incomes 
relative to those of young people (see Boskin,  Knetter, and Kotlikoff [I9851 
and Gokhale,  Kotlikoff, and Sabelhaus [1994]). 
A Sim~le  Model of the Effects of ~nnuitization~ 
Analysis of the steady state of the following simple two-period life- 
cycle model clarifies the theoretical argument that connects increased 
annuitization to the decline in bequests and national saving:  Agents live for 
two periods.  They work full time when young (earning W)  and consume C  when  Y 
young and C,  when old.  Population is stationary,  and the size of each cohort 
is normalized to unity.  Each agent survives to old age with probability 
(1).  There is no private annuities market.  However, the government 
provides annuities by imposing a tax of T on each cohort when young and 
returning this amount with interest to surviving members of the cohort when 
old.  Since there are (1-p)  survivors in each cohort,  each survivor receives 
an annuity of T(l+r)/(l-p),  where r is the real interest rate. 
If the tax,  T,  does not exhaust private saving,  members who die prior to 
their last period of life will leave a bequest.  Assuming bequests are divided 
equally among the young,  the bequest received per young person is pB,  where p 
is the fraction of each cohort that dies before reaching old age and B is the 
bequest made per decedent. 
At the beginning of any period (before anyone has died),  total wealth in 
the economy,  K,  equals the sum of private wealth of the elderly plus the 
This model is also presented in  Auerbach et al. (1992). 
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the aggregate tax payments of each generation.  Private wealth of the elderly 
can be traced to their saving when young,  W+pB-T-C  Total wealth is just  Y' 
this sum plus T,  so 
For those leaving bequests,  we have 
For those agents who survive to old age,  consumption,  Co, is given by 
where the first term on the right-hand side of (3) represents principal plus 
interest on private savings,  and the second term is the government's annuity 
payment to survivors.  We close the model by assuming that agents maximize an 
expected, time-separable, homothetic utility function over consumption  when 
young and old,  given by 
where a is the time preference parameter.  Maximization of utility subject to 
the budget constraint given in (3)  implies that consumption  when old is 
proportional to consumption  when young,  i.e., 
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The above equations imply 
According to equation (6),  aggregate wealth is a decreasing function of T,  the 
amount of saving which is annuitized by the government.  The intuition for 
this result is clear from equations (1)-(3)  and (5).  According to  (1) and 
(2),  raising T lowers the steady-state level of bequests as well as the 
steady-state capital stock, ignoring induced changes in consumption when 
young.  If consumption  when young were to fall as much as inheritances 
received when young (pB),  aggregate wealth would remain unchanged.  But, 
according to equations (3) and (5),  consumption when young falls by less than 
pB for two reasons.  First,  the propensity to consume when young is less than 
unity.  Second,  the annuity provided by the government increases the amount 
each generation can afford to consume over its lifetime because it reduces 
undesired bequests.  6 
In  our model, agents have no interest in leaving bequests and,  therefore, 
no interest in purchasing life insurance.  As Yaari (1965) first demonstrated, 
the purchase of term life insurance is equivalent to the sale of an annuity. 
In this model,  we are assuming that one cannot purchase annuities at 
the margin from private insurance companies.  Allowing for such purchases 
would change the value of 0. 
Note that the reduction in aggregate wealth arising here is not,  as in 
Feldstein (1974),  the result of the government's directly transferring 
resources from the young to the old,  but rather the result of the government's 
indirectly helping the old to reduce their transfers to the young. 
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purchase of life insurance,  we would find that government annuitization  of the 
saving of the young would simply lead them to purchase more life insurance; 
i.e.,  the annuities purchased by the government would be immediately resold. 
111. Estimating Annuitized and Nonannuitized Resources 
In this study,  we calculate the amounts of nonannuitized and annuitized 
resources for all male and female adult cohorts for the years 1960-1990.  The 
components of annuitized resources are the present values of future labor 
earnings (human  wealth),  Social Security benefits,  private and government 
employee pension benefits,  government health-care benefits,  welfare benefits, 
other government transfers, and,  entering as negative annuities, the present 
values of future taxes.  Taxes include labor and capital income taxes, 
indirect taxes,  payroll taxes,  and property and other taxes.  Nonannuitized 
resources refer to holdings of net wealth. 
The computation of cohorts' nonannuitized resources for each year between 
1960 and 1990 involves distributing by age and sex each year's aggregate value 
of household net wealth.  The computation of each annuitized resource 
component employs a common strategy.  First,  for each year,  the national 
aggregate for a particular type of payment (or receipt) is distributed by age 
and sex according to the cross-section, age-sex relative profile that is 
applicable to that payment (or receipt).  For example,  aggregate 1965 Social 
Security benefits are distributed according to the age-sex relative profile 
for these benefits that prevailed in 1965.  This yields estimates of the per 
capita amounts of the payment (or receipt) by age and sex for that year.  The 
per capita annuity values for years after 1992 are estimated by either 1) 
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available cross-section relative profile or 2)  assuming that age- and sex- 
specific per capita  values equal their respective  values in 1992 or some later 
year except for an adjustment for productivity growth. 
Second,  for each generation in a given year t (say,  males born in 1966), 
the present value of all future per capita payments of a particular type (say, 
indirect tax payments) is computed by multiplying these future per capita 
payments by the generation's projected population in those years,  discounting 
these values back to year t,  and dividing the sum of the discounted values by 
the number of  members of the generation alive in the base year.  This method 
produces actuarially discounted present values of the particular receipt or 
payment for each generation alive in  period t. 
As an example of this method for calculating the different components of 
annuitized resources,  consider the estimate of human wealth (HW).  Our formula 
for human wealth in  year t of a person of sex x born in year k,  HW~~,~,  is 
where e  stands for the average earnings in  year s of a member of the  s,k 
generation born in year k  and of sex x,  pXSSk  is the population in  year s of 
the same generation,  R=l/(l+r),  where r is the rate of interest,  and D is the 
maximumage of life.  The calculationof e  is givenby  s  ,k 
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ratio in year s of the average earnings of the generation  born in year k of 
sex x divided by the average earnings in year s of our reference group - 
those males who were age 40 in year s (i.e.,  those for whom k=s-40). 
The construction of relative profiles by age and sex,  dxtSk,  is described 
in equations (9) and (10): 
In equation (9), zxs  ,k  is the weighted average (across cohort members indexed 
by i) of labor income.  IVXsPk  is the number of observations in year s of indi- 
viduals of sex x born in year k,  zxs,k,i  is the wage and salary income of the 
ith individual of sex x in year s who was born in year k,  and w~~,~,~  is the 
person weight of this observation.  Equation (10) shows the calculation in 
year s of the average labor income of members of the generation with sex x who 
were born in  year k,  relative to that of contemporaneous 40-year-old males. 
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The national aggregates used in our calculations come from the National 
Income and Product Accounts (NIPA),  the Federal Reserve System's  Flow of Funds 
(FOF),  The American Council of Life Insurance (ACLI),  the U.S. Census Bureau's 
Current Population Survey (CPS),  and the Survey of Current Business (SCB).  The 
sources for cross-section relative profiles are the CPS, the Survey of Income 
and Program Participation (SIPP),  the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES),  the 
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF),  the Social Security Administration's Annual 
Statistical Supplement (SSASS),  and the Health Care Financing Administration 
(HCFA).  The computations also use the historic and projected population 
counts of the Social Security Administration (SSA). 7 
The following is a more detailed description of our data sources and 
proj  ections  : 
Labor Income 
Aggregate labor income between 1960 and 1992 is calculated as labor's 
share of NIPA-reported national income.  For each of these years,  labor's 
share of national income is calculated under the assumption that its share of 
proprietorship income is the same as its share of national income.  8 
Relative profiles of labor income by age and sex are calculated for each 
year between 1963 and 1992 using that year's CPS data on individual wages and 
SSA's projections are available through the year 2066.  These projec- 
tions were extended to the year 2200 by using SSA's mortality, fertility,  and 
immigration  assumptions for the year 2066. 
Labor income's share of national income is a,  where a satisfies C + 
aPI = aNI.  In  this equation, C is compensation paid to employees,  PI is 
proprietorship income,  and NI is national income.  The calculated values of a 
are very stable over the years 1960-1992, ranging between 0.76 and 0.82.- 
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(1971) and estimated for each year the average wage and salary for top-coded 
observations.  Their procedure uses the fact that the upper tail of the wage 
and salary distribution can  be well approximated by the Pareto distribution. 
Values of average wages for top-coded observations were calculated separately 
for males and females.  These values were assigned to all top-coded observa- 
tions before computing relative wage profiles.  The annual profiles were 
smoothed over age by using a seven-year moving average of wages and salaries. 
The 1963 profiles are used to distribute aggregate labor income for years 
prior to 1963,  and the 1992 profiles are applied for years after 1992.  Per 
capita labor income for years beyond 1992 is projected under the assumption 
that,  except for an adjustment for growth,  cohorts of a given age and sex earn 
the same average labor income in future years as cohorts of that age and sex 
earned in 1992.  For example,  males who are age 50 in 1993 are assumed to earn 
the same amount on average,  apart from an adjustment for growth,  as males who 
were age 50 in 1992.  The growth adjustment is 0.75  percent per year.  Thus, 
the projected average earnings of males age 50 in,  say,  1994 equals the 
corresponding 1992 average for 50-year-old  males,  multiplied by (1.0075). 
Private and Government Emvlovee Pensions.  Workers' Com~ensation.  and Veterans' 
Benefits 
This category includes four types of income -- benefits from private 
pension plans,  workers' compensation,  veterans' benefits, and government 
employee pensions.  Aggregate private pension benefits for the years 1960-1988 
are the NIPA estimates reported in Park (1992).  The NIPA estimates are based 
The small number of observations precluded separate estimation by age. 
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estimates that are based upon household surveys.  Estimates of aggregate 
private pension benefits for 1989 through 1992 were derived by extrapolating 
the 1988 reported level of  benefits using the 1984-1988 average annual growth 
rate of real aggregate private pension benefits.  The aggregates for the other 
three types of benefits are reported in the SCB. 
The relative profiles of the four types of income are computed from the 
March CPS.  This survey contains information on income from a variety of 
sources including company or union pensions,  workers' compensation,  veterans' 
benefits,  government employee pensions,  and receipts from annuities and other 
regular contributions.  Retirement,  disability,  and survivor benefits are 
included for each type of income., 
Unfortunately,  receipts from several sources of retirement income are 
aggregated into one variable in the CPS data.  For example, in the 1980-88 
data,  private pension income is combined with income from government employee 
pensions (including federal,  state,  and local government pensions,  as well as 
military retirement pensions).  Fortunately,  the CPS specifies for each obser- 
vation the different types of income that are being combined into the pension 
and other income variable.  We use this information to identify, for each age 
and sex,  those observations receiving only private pensions and those 
receiving only government employee pensions.  Next,  we calculate,  again by age 
and sex,  the average values of the two types of income.  Finally,  we compute 
the ratio of average private pension income to the sum of the averages of 
income from private and government employee pensions.  The ratio of average 
government employee pensions to average pension receipts for this age-sex 
category is one minus the ratio of average private pensions to average pension 
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government employee pensions for observations receiving both types of income. 
The computation  of relative profiles for each year uses the age- and sex- 
specific cell averages of actual and imputed private and government employee 
pension income, smoothed across age using a seven-year moving average. 
Separate profiles were obtained for each of the four categories of income 
for each year between 1970 and 1992.  The 1970 profiles were used to 
distribute the national aggregates of these payments in years prior to 1970. 
For years after 1992,  real average pension benefits at a given age and sex are 
set equal to their 1992 values, adjusted for the assumed 0.75  percent rate of 
growth. 
Social Security Benefits 
Aggregate Social Security benefits between 1960 and 1992 are those 
reported by NIPA.  Between 1993 and 2004 we use the Office of Management and 
Budget's  (OMB) projections of Social Security benefits computed on a NIPA 
basis.  Aggregate Social Security Old Age,  Survivor,  and Disability Insurance 
(OASDI) benefits after 2004 equal the 2004 aggregate adjusted for growth.  The 
growth rates applied in this case are those embedded in a special Social 
Security Administration projection of total benefit payments for years after 
2004.  This projection incorporates Social Security's  intermediate economic 
and demographic assumptions,  with one exception: the productivity growth rate 
is assumed to equal 0.75  percent. 
The SSASS reports average benefits by age and sex by type of benefit as 
well as the total number of recipients in each age-sex category.  These data 
were used to form population-weighted per capita OASDI benefit profiles by age 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmand  sex.  Relative profiles of  OASDI  benefits for each year  from  1960 through 
1990 were  obtained  from  that year's  SSASS.  For  years after 1990 we  use the 
1990 relative profile of  Social Security benefits by  age  and  sex. 
Medicare  and Medicaid  Benefits 
Aggregate  Medicare  and Medicaid  payments  from  the inceptions of  these 
programs  through  1992  are those reported by  NIPA.  OMB  provided us with 
unpublished projections,  on  a NIPA basis, of  aggregate Medicare  payments  for 
the years 1993  through 2004.  For  the years between  2004  and  2030,  we  extrapo- 
lated aggregate Medicare payments  using HCFA's  2004-2030  projected Medicare 
growth  rates.  In the case of  Medicaid,  we  applied HCFA's  projected annual 
Medicaid  growth  rates between  1993 and  2030  to the 1992 aggregate NIPA value 
of  Medicaid.  Medicare  and  Medicaid  payments  beyond  2030  are assumed  to grow 
in accordance with demographic  change  and  our assumed  productivity growth 
rate.  Relative profiles of  Medicare  and Medicaid benefits are based  on  HCFA 
data on  average benefits by  age  and  sex.  In the case of  Medicare,  the data 
are available only by  five-year  age  groups. 
Unemplo~ent  Insurance, Aid  to Families with Dependent  Children,  Food  Stamps 
and General Welfare  Benefits 
Aggregate  values  of  these  federal,  state, and  local transfers are those 
reported by  NIPA.  Supplemental  security income,  as well as transfers for 
employment and  training, are distributed according to the relative profile for 
AFDC.  General welfare benefits  include federal black-lung  benefits, state 
general assistance,  state energy assistance, education benefits, and  other 
federal, state, and  local transfers.  The  aggregate  amount  of  earned  income 
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Profiles for unemployment  insurance,  food stamps, AFDC,  and  general welfare 
are computed  from  the 1983 SIPP.  These  relative profiles are used,  in 
conjunction with year-specific  population counts by  age and  sex, to distribute 
their respective aggregate expenditures by  age  and  sex for all of  the years 
between  1960 and  1992.  For  future years, we  assume  that the age-  and  sex- 
specific values of  each of  these different types of  transfer payments  keep 
pace  with productivity growth. 
Labor  Income  Taxes 
Aggregate  federal, state, and  local income  taxes for 1960 through  1992 
are those reported by  NIPA.  For  1992  through  2004,  we  use  OMB's  projections 
of  federal income  tax revenues.  State and  local income  taxes for 1993 through 
2004  are projected using  OMB's  GDP  forecast and assuming that the same  ratio 
of  state and  local income  taxes to GDP  prevails between  1993 and  2004  as that 
which  prevailed in 1992. 
Aggregate  labor income  taxes in each year  are calculated as the product 
of  total federal, state, and local income  taxes and  labor's  share of  national 
income.  We  distribute aggregate labor income  taxes based on  the CPS  profiles 
of  labor income  described above.  After 2004,  we  assume  that age-  and  sex- 
specific values of  labor income  taxes keep  pace with productivity growth. 
Pavroll Taxes 
The  NIPA  reports aggregate values of  payroll taxes from  1960 through 
1992.  OMB  provided us with projections  of  aggregate federal payroll taxes 
from  1993 through  2004.  Aggregate  state and  local payroll taxes for 1993 
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2004 and the assumption that the 1992 ratio of state and local payroll taxes 
to GDP prevails through 2004.  Aggregate payroll taxes in the years 1960-2004 
are distributed by age and sex according to 1963-1992 CPS profiles of covered 
earnings,  where covered earnings refers to labor earnings that are subject to 
Social Security payroll taxes.  lo  Age- and sex-specific values of payroll 
taxes beyond 2004 are assumed to equal their 2004 values, adjusted for growth. 
Excise and Sales Taxes 
The NIPA is our source for aggregate excise tax (including property tax) 
and sales tax revenue from 1960 through 1992.  For the period 1993-2004, we 
use OMB projections of federal excise and sales tax revenues.  State and local 
excise and sales tax revenues between 1993 and 2004 are calculated using the 
1992 ratio of these revenues to GDP and applying OMB's GDP forecasts through 
2004. 
Relative age-sex profiles of excise and sales taxes were calculated from 
the 1960-61, 1972-73, 1984-86, and 1987-90 CES.  Separate profiles were 
constructed for tobacco,  alcohol,  property taxes,  and all other sales and 
excise taxes.  The 1960-61 profiles were used for years prior to 1966.  The 
1972-73 profiles were used for the years 1967 through 1978.  The 1984-86 
profiles were used for the years 1979 through 1986,  and the 1987-90 profiles 
were used for 1987 and beyond.  Age- and sex-specific values of sales and 
lo  Unfortunately, the data do not permit the calculation  of separate 
profiles for state and local payroll taxes,  which are not necessarily subject 
to earnings ceilings.  However,  non-Social Security payroll taxes are a small 
fraction of the total (less than 30 percent),  so the bias associated with 
using Social Security covered earnings profiles is likely to be small. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmexcise taxes beyond 2004 are assumed to equal the 2004 values,  adjusted for 
growth. 
Capital Income Taxes 
Aggregate capital income taxes between 1960 and 2004 are calculated as 
capital's share of national income multiplied by actual or projected values of 
aggregate federal,  state,  and local income tax revenues.  Relative profiles of 
capital income taxes come from the 1962 and 1983 SCFs.  These profiles are 
based upon weighted average net-worth holdings by age and sex,  where the 
weights applied are SCF person weights.  This procedure could be applied only 
to individuals age 80 or less because of limited data for older individuals. 
The profile of average net-worth holdings by age and sex was smoothed and 
extrapolated through age 90  using a fourth-order polynomial.  Age-  and sex- 
specific values of capital income taxes after 2004 are assumed to equal the 
2004  values, adjusted for growth. 
Nonhuman Wealth 
Age- and sex-specific values of nonhuman wealth (NHW) in each year 
between 1960 and 1992 are constructed by distributing by age and sex each 
year's level of total private net wealth.  Aggregate private net wealth for 
these years is reported in the FOF.~~  The relative profiles of wealth 
holdings by age and sex are calculated by using data from the 1963 and 1983 
SCF.  In estimating the relative profiles, components of wealth that are owned 
jointly by members of a multiperson household are divided equally among such 
Our aggregates are net of the FOF's estimate of the value of residen- 
tial structures,  plant, and equipment owned by nonprofit institutions. 
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profiles are used for years after 1983.  The profiles for intermediate years 
are constructed by linearly interpolating  between the 1963 and 1983 profiles. 
The Term Value of Life Insurance 
Aggregate face values of life insurance for the years 1960 through 1992 
are reported by the ACLI.  The 1962 and 1983 SCF are used to distribute these 
amounts by age and sex.  Fortunately,  the SCFs report term as well as face 
values of life insurance.  Consequently,  we were able to calculate the ratio 
of term value to face value of life insurance on an age- and sex-specific 
basis for the years 1962 and 1983.  Multiplying these ratios by our calculated 
age- and sex-specific face values of insurance produced age- and sex-specific 
term values of insurance for 1962 and 1983,  and,  after interpolating,  for 
other years as well.  12 
V. Findings 
A.  Changes  in the Cohort Distribution of Resources 
Total Resources 
The total resources of a cohort is the sum of its human,  nonhuman,  and 
pension wealth, less its generational account.  The generational account 
refers to the present value of a sex-specific generation's  future tax payments 
net of the present value of its future receipts of transfer payments.  Our 
calculations include all tax payments made to,  and transfer payments received 
from,  federal, state,  and local governments. 
12~ote  that the cash value of life insurance is counted as part of 
nonhuman wealth. 
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resource components for male and female cohorts in 10-year age groups for the 
years 1960,  1970,  1980,  and 1990.  The tables also show the per capita 
resources of all cohorts age.20-89 and of older cohorts age 65-89.  For the 
entire populations of males and females,  total resources grew substantially 
over the three decades since 1960;but  they grew more rapidly for the elderly 
and for women.  For males as a group,  per capita resources rose by 39.6 
percent.  For older males, they grew by 119.9 percent.  For females as a 
group,  per capita resources rose by 124.0  percent.  For older females,  they 
grew by 123.8 percent.  Between 1960 and 1990 female per capita resources rose 
from 39 percent to 62  percent of male per capita resources. 
Some of the reported differences in resource growth across ages and sex 
are particularly striking.  For example,  males age 20-29  experienced only a 
7.1 percent increase in their average resources over the 30 years,  whereas 
males age 70-79  experienced a 125.5  percent increase,  and females age 20-29 
experienced a 153.5  percent increase. 
The relative growth in elderly Americans' resources appears primarily to 
reflect government intergenerational redistribution,  coupled with improvements 
in their longevity.  Between 1960 and 1990,  the average generational account 
of older males fell from -$3,400 to -$80,200.  The decline was even larger for 
older females.  Their average generational account was -$6,600 in 1960,  but in 
1990 it was -$99,300.  Over the same period, the generational accounts of 
younger cohorts rose dramatically.  For example, the accounts of males age 20- 
29 rose from $145,800  to $191,700  and those of females age 20-29 rose from 
$66,900  to $118,800. The components of generational accounts shown in tables 
3a and 3b clearly indicate that changes in the relative values of the genera- 
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Security and government-provided health-care benefits (Medicare and Medicaid), 
on the one hand,  and increases in labor income and payroll taxation,  on the 
other. 
The relative growth in femalesf  resources primarily reflects their 
increased participation in the labor force.  According to tables 2a and 2b, in 
1960 the human wealth of females age 20-29 was $148,900  per capita -  just 29 
percent of the corresponding male value of $521,500. In 1990,  the per capita 
human wealth of females in this age range was $326,600  -- 56 percent of the 
1990 male average of $581,800. 
/ 
The Composition of Total Resources 
Tables 4a and 4b show the composition of total resources.  For younger 
cohorts of both sexes,  human wealth represents the bulk of resources.  The 
reason is simply that most of their working years lie in the future.  In fact, 
these cohortsf  human wealth is larger than their total resources because the 
latter are calculated net of their positive generational accounts.  In 
contrast,  older cohortsf  total resources are predominantly held in the form of 
nonhuman wealth.  Over the three decades,  the share of human wealth in total 
resources declined for all male cohorts over 40.  The same is true for female 
cohorts age 50 and over. 
For the male population as a whole, the share of nonhuman wealth in total 
resources remained roughly constant,  but it declined significantly for male 
cohorts over 65 years of age.  The share of nonhuman wealth declined for the 
female  population as a whole, and it declined significantly for women over 65. 
The decline from 85 to 52 percent in the share of nonhuman wealth for older 
females was greater than the decline from 74 to 53 percent for older males. 
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growing component of total resources.  Its share of total resources increased 
from 10 to 18 percent for older males and from 5 to 9 percent for older 
females.  The share of resources represented by generational accounts also 
changed significantly over the three decades.  Generational accounts as a 
share of total resources increased for males age 39 or less,  but declined 
significantly for females in the same age categories.  For older males the 
excess, in present value,  of future transfers over future taxes (the negative 
of the generational account) made up almost a quarter of total resources in 
1990,  compared with only 2 percent in 1960.  The corresponding female figures 
are 37 percent in 1990 and 5 percent in 1960. 
Tables 5a and 5b express the components of generational accounts as 
shares of total resources.  Among other things,  they show that health benefits 
rose from an insignificant share of elderly Americans' resources in 1960 to 14 
percent of older males' resources and 23 percent of older females' resources 
in 1990. 
B. Changes in Bequeathable and Annuitized Resources 
Tables 6a and 6b present the components of bequeathable resources - 
nonhuman wealth plus the term value of life insurance -  as well as the 
difference between bequeathable resources and total resources.  This 
difference is annuitized resources.  Tables 7a and 7b report these components 
as a fraction of total resources.  The degree of resource annuitization,  R~, 
is computed as the ratio of annuitized to total resources,  i.e.: 
(11) 
a  R=l-  TERM + NHW 
HW+NHW+PW-GA  ' 
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average human wealth,  NHW stands for average nonhuman wealth, PW stands for 
average private pension wealth,  and GA stands for the generational account. 
Table 7a shows a significant increase in Ra for older males -- from 0.22 
in 1960 for cohorts age 65 and older to 0.45  in 1990.  For older female 
cohorts,  the increase reported in table 7b is even larger -- from 0.12  in 1960 
to 0.47 in 1990.  This larger annuitized share of elderly persons' resources 
implies,  of course,  an equal and opposite decline in their share of bequeath- 
able resources. 
The increased annuitization of older males is offset by the decreased 
annuitization  of younger males.  Because younger males outnumber older ones, 
overall male resource annuitization  declines by a small amount.  Specifically, 
Ra for males falls from 0.74  to 0.69.  For females,  however,  the ratio of 
annuitized to total resources increases for all age cohorts.  For the female 
population as a whole, Ra rises from 0.33 to 0.53  during this period. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
The calculations reported earlier assume a 0.75  percent rate of produc- 
tivity growth (g)  and a discount rate (r) of 6  percent.  We denote these as 
the base-case values for r and g.  Table 8  examines the sensitivity of Ra to 
alternative interest rate assumptions.  As the table shows,  the conclusion 
that the resource annuitization of the elderly has increased dramatically 
since 1960  holds for values of r of 3,  6,  and 9 percent. 
Higher interest rates produce smaller values of annuitized resources,  but 
they do so for each of the years considered.  Hence, they do not have much 
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resources.  For example,  when r equals 9.0  percent, Ra in 1960 is 0.19 for 
elderly males and 0.08  for elderly females.  These values are smaller than the 
respective base case (r=0.06 g=0.75) amounts 0.22  and 0.12.  However, the 
growth in Ra for elderly males and females between 1960 and 1990 is about the 
same in this case as in the base case.  For older males,  Ra rises from 0.19 to 
0.40,  compared to 0.22 to 0.45 in the base case.  For older females,  Ra rises 
from 0.08  to 0.42,  compared with 0.12 to 0.47  in the base case. 
As mentioned, projected health benefits are an important component of 
annuitized resources for the elderly and the middle-aged.  Table 9 examines 
the degree to which Ra would be different under alternative assumptions 
regarding future government health-care policies.  We consider three alterna- 
tives to the current policy (the base case).  The first incorporates the 
administration's official revenue and expenditure projections for President 
Clinton's health reform proposal (columns 3 and 4  in table 9).  Through the 
turn of the century,  the President's plan entails essentially the same total 
level of spending on  health care (if one includes the proposed new subsidies 
to early retirees,  etc.) as under current policy.  However,  after the turn of 
the century,  real government health-care spending is slated to grow no faster 
than the rate warranted by demographic change and growth in labor produc- 
tivity. 
The second health-care policy alternative (columns 5 and 6 in table 9) 
modifies the projections arising under the President's plan by assuming that 
real Medicare spending will grow from 2000 through 2020 at a rate 2 percent 
higher than the plan foresees.  The third health-care policy (columns 7 and 8 
in table 9) limits growth in real government health-care spending to the 
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in 1994. 
As table 9 shows,  incorporating the administration's official revenue and 
expenditure projections under President Clinton's health-care plan,  with or 
without the extra 2 percent growth between 2000 and 2020,  reduces the values 
of Ra only very slightly.  For the elderly, the reductions in Ra are evident 
only for the 1990 figures.  This is because for the elderly in 1980 and 
earlier, the benefit cuts will occur only in the distant future.  For the 
entire population,  however,  reductions in  Ra are seen as early as 1980 
because,  compared to the base case,  the benefit cuts will have been fully 
phased in by the time these cohorts receive government health-care benefits.  13 
Compared with the base case,  even a policy of stabilizing  health-care 
spending beginning in 1994 does not significantly alter the degree of 
annuitization for the elderly.  Under the base case,  47 percent of the 
resources of older females are annuitized in 1990,  compared with 44 percent 
under the 1994 stabilization policy.  For older males, the respective figures 
are 45 percent and 43 percent.  Thus,  the post-1960 increase in annuitization 
remains dramatic, despite the 1994 stabilization  policy. 
C. Implications for Aggregate Bequests and National Saving 
As discussed earlier, cohorts with higher degrees of annuitization will, 
ceteris paribus, bequeath less and consume more.  To assess the impact on 
aggregate bequests of changes since 1960 in Americans' degree of annuitiza- 
13~he  1990 annuitization ratio for females as a whole is slightly larger 
for the 2 percent faster  health-care cost growth (0.52) than under the Clinton 
health reform scenario (0.51).  This occurs because younger females receive 
substantially  more in health-care benefits over their remaining lifetimes 
under the former scenario. 
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values of r and g.  We do so by multiplying the aggregate 1990 values of 
bequeathable wealth (net worth plus term life insurance) for individual male 
and female cohorts by their respective 1990 mortality probabilities.  Summing 
the products over all cohorts yields an aggregate 1990  bequest flow of $245.1 
billion.  Next,  we calculate 1990 aggregate bequests under the assumption that 
a cohort's bequeathable resources in 1990 equal its total resources in 1990 
multiplied by its 1960 ratio of bequeathable resources to total resources. 
This produces a 1990  bequest flow of $360.8  billion for the base case.  Thus, 
without the post-1960 increase in resource annuitization,  aggregate 1990 
bequests would have been an estimated 47.2  percent larger.  Note that we hold 
the total resources of each cohort fixed in this counterfactual experiment. 
The $115.7 billion difference between these two bequest amounts constitutes 
the additional amount that generations alive in 1990 appear likely to have 
consumed as a consequence of this increased annuitization.  This $115.7 
billion figure is substantial:  It represents 74 percent of total net national 
saving in 1990. 
Table 10 indicates that the percentage reduction in estimated 1990 
bequests due to the increased resource annuitization would not be much 
affected by any of the three alternative future paths of health-care spending 
by the government;  even if health-care spending were stabilized in 1994,  the 
reduction would be a sizable 41 percent.  Table 11 examines the sensitivity of 
the reduction in bequests under alternative assumptions for r.  Large reduc- 
tions are indicated for each interest-rate assumption.  The smallest reduction 
in bequests is 40.8  percent, and the largest is 55.5  percent. 
A different question about the reliability of these findings involves our 
use of the random bequest method to estimate the flow of bequests.  This 
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who actually die at age x at time t do not differ systematically with respect 
to their wealth holdings and life insurance from those who do not actually die 
at age x at time t. 
Admittedly,  many of those who actually die at age x at time t may know 
ahead of time that they are about to die and spend down some of their assets 
through high living.  In addition,  those who actually die may incur particu- 
larly large uninsured medical expenses.  But this bias in the random death 
method's calculation of bequests,  whatever its size, is a bias that holds for 
each of our calculations of actual bequests in 1990,  as well as the 
hypothetical bequests that would have prevailed in 1990 had the degree of 
annuitization been that of 1960.  Indeed,  if one assumes that in 1990 end-of- 
life uninsured medical expenses,  as well as other end-of-life  expenses,  would 
have been the same had Americansr  annuitization  been that of 1960,  our proce- 
dure underestimates the percentage decline in bequests.  14,15 
VI  .  Conclusion 
This paper combines a large array of micro and macro data to study 
changes since 1960 in the degree of annuitization of Americansr  resources 
Although we find no increase in the annuitization of younger Americans,  we 
find a dramatic increase in the degree of annuitization of older Americans. 
This finding is robust to alternative assumptions about interest and growth 
l4  The reason is that the difference in bequests is the same,  but the 
level of actual 1990 bequests is smaller,  producing a larger percentage change 
in bequests in the hypothetical exercise. 
15see,  for example,  Scheiner and Weil (1992) for evidence of decumulation 
of housing wealth just prior to death. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmrates,  as well as to various possible courses of future U.S.  health-care 
policy. 
The increase in the annuitization of the elderly reflects increases in 
their receipt of Social Security and health transfers,  coupled with their 
failure to increase their purchase of life insurance.  Since the elderly have 
much higher mortality probabilities, their degree of annuitization is critical 
to the flow of bequests.  According to our base-case  estimates,  holding fixed 
the total resources of each cohort,  current aggregate U.S.  bequests would be 
roughly 50 percent larger if these resources,  particularly those of older 
Americans,  were annuitized to the same degree as they were in 1960.  In 
addition,  U.S.  national saving would likely be substantially larger. 
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Consumption of the Elderly Relative to the Young 
Comparison  1960-61  1972-73  1984-86  1987-90 
Male 70/Male 30  .672  .802  1.135  1.247 
Female 70/Male 30  .667  .798  1.045  1.112 
Male 70/Female 30  .664  .763  1.059  1.202 
Female 70/Female 30  -659  .760  .975  1.072 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
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Total  Resources  and  Resource  Components -- Male Cohorts  1960-90 
(Population  Weighted  Averages  in  Thousands  of  1992  Dollars) 
Age  Group:  20-29  30-39  40-49  50-59  60-69  70-79  80-89  20-89  65-89 
TOTAL  RESOURCES 
1960  410.4  419.8  374.5  286.3  204.9  152.9  105.7  339.9  160.3 
1970  427.3  477.1  456.6  384.1  281.9  205.9  122.3  398.5  212.0 
1980  416.2  492.2  498.9  454.6  368.3  271.9  187.0  432.0  285.3 
1990  439.5  504.1  540.4  522.7  459.1  344.8  185.5  474.5  352.6 
%  Increase 
1  990/ 1960  7.1  20.0  44.3  82.6  124.1  125.5  75.5  39.6  119.9 
HUMAN  WEALTH 
1960  521.5  476.7  358.1  202.7  65.6  13.4  5.9  332.7  21.6 
1970  557.4  548.7  419.5  240.2  70.2  11.9  4.2  374.9  19.5 
1980  548.2  561.7  437.1  248.9  66.9  10.7  3.2  389.1  18.3 
1990  581.8  581.5  472.3  258.8  69.7  14.2  5.2  413.7  21.8 
%  Increase 
1990/1960  11.6  22.0  31.9  27.7  6.3  6.0  -11.9  24.3  0.1 
NON-HUMAN  WEALTH 
1960  12.0  44.4  81.8  112.2  126.5  119.2  92.6  71.3  119.1 
1970  12.9  49.1  100.3  143.5  162.5  142.8  84.1  85.3  141.5 
1980  17.1  62.6  122.1  170.0  191.0  177.1  128.5  98.3  175.4 
1990  18.1  61.6  131.8  198.2  225.0  190.6  89.6  108.2  187.1 
%  Increase 
1990/1960  50.8  38.7  61.1  76.6  77.9  59.9  -3.2  51.8  57.1 
PENSION  WEALTH 
1960  22.7  30.2  32.0  24.4  21.3  14.9  6.9  25.7  16.2 
1970  26.6  37.8  51.4  50.6  37.1  25.0  14.1  38.4  26.5 
1980  27.9  41.7  61.6  80.0  70.1  36.1  20.7  49.2  42.9 
1990  31.4  46.1  68.7  95.3  94.2  57.7  27.0  58.5  63.5 
X  Increase 
1990/ 1960  38.3  52.6  114.7  290.6  342.3  287.2  291.3  127.6  291.4 
GENERATIONAL  ACCOUNT 
Source:  Authors1 calculations. 
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Total  Resources  and  Resource Components -  Female  Cohorts  1960-90 
(Population Weighted  Averages  in Thousads  of  1992 Dollars) 
Age  Group:  20-29  30-39  40-49  50-59  60-69  70-79  80-89  20-89  65-89 
TOTAL  RESOURCES 
1960  96.2  112.3  154.8  169.8  147.2  115.1  89.3  131.0  120.1 
1970  163.4  171.5  199.6  222.6  219.3  161.7  83.8  185.7  163.6 
1980  204.7  237.0  274.3  291.2  281.5  229.2  166.9  244.5  229.9 
1990  243.9  289.4  323.9  349.5  362.8  278.4  129.5  293.5  268.7 
%  Increase 
1990/1960  153.5  157.7  109.2  105.8  146.5  141.9  45.0  124.0  123.8 
HUMAN  WEALTH 
1960  148.9  121.1  98.9  60.5  17.3  2.9  0.5  87.6  5.2 
1970  227.0  173.3  124.5  72.4  20.9  2.9  0.7  121.0  5.1 
1980  286.4  251.0  168.2  82.0  20.8  3.0  0.8  163.1  5.0 
1990  326.6  301.1  229.5  111.8  25.3  4.4  1.3  198.3  6.5 
%  Increase 
1990/1960  119.3  148.6  132.1  84.8  46.2  51.7  160.0  126.4  23.1 
NOW-HUMAN  WEALTH 
1960  7.2  42.9  91.9  118.1  113.8  99.9  88.4  72.1  101.9 
1970  13.1  56.9  104.6  139.1  147.1  114.5  56.7  85.4  113.7 
1980  11.9  62.5  134.9  175.0  172.0  146.6  116.6  99.9  146.8 
1990  25.0  79.9  132.2  183.2  203.9  147.3  36.0  108.5  138.7 
%  Increase 
1990/1960  247.2  86.2  43.9  55.1  79.2  47.4  -59.3  50.5  36.1 
PENSION  WEALTH 
1960  7.1  9.3  9.8  11.0  10.0  5.6  2.3  8.9  6.4 
1970  8.2  12.0  16.0  16.8  16.9  10.7  5.2  12.9  11.5 
1980  9.7  13.8  20.4  26.8  24.4  16.5  9.7  17.1  17.0 
1990  11.1  15.8  23.1  32.8  34.5  23.2  14.8  21.0  24.2 
%  Increase 
1990/1960  56.3  69.9  135.7  198.2  245.0  314.3  543.5  134.8  276.6 
GENERATIONAL  ACCOUNT 
Source:  Authors1  calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 3a 
The  Components  of  Generational  Accounts -  Male Cohorts  1960-90 
(Population Ueighted Averages  in  Thousands  of  1992  Dollars) 
Age  Group:  20-29  30-39  40-49  50-59  60-69  70-79  80-89  20-89  65-89 
LABOR  INCOME  TAXES 
1960  60.2  53.6  39.1  21.4  6.8  1.4  0.6  37.2  2.2 
1970  70.0  67.5  51.0  28.6  8.2  1.4  0.5  46.1  2.3 
1980  72.8  73.6  56.7  32.4  8.8  1.4  0.4  51.1  2.4 
1990  80.0  78.8  62.9  33.8  9.0  1.8  0.7  55.9  2.8 
PAYROLL  TAXES 
1960  50.3  40.1  27.3  14.6  4.5  0.9  0.3  28.2  1.5 
1970  69.1  60.4  43.0  23.7  6.8  1.2  0.4  42.0  1.9 
1980  77.7  75.1  55.8  30.7  8.1  1.3  0.4  52.4  2.2 
1990  86.5  83.9  66.5  35.8  9.4  1.9  0.7  59.7  2.9 
INDIRECT  TAXES 
1960  45.5  43.6  36.2  25.1  14.9  8.0  4.4  33.3  9.4 
1970  49.7  49.4  41.8  31.2  19.5  11.1  6.6  38.3  12.5 
1980  51.2  51.7  44.7  34.4  23.1  13.8  8.3  41.4  15.3 
1990  57.2  57.3  50.9  39.1  27.1  17.0  9.1  46.7  18.4 
CAPITAL  INCOME  TAXES 
1960  18.4  26.2  31.1  30.5  23.9  14.6  7.4  24.9  16.5 
1970  19.1  27.0  31.6  31.2  26.1  17.3  8.4  25.5  18.5 
1980  21.3  29.9  35.6  34.8  28.7.  20.6  13.3  28.0  21.7 
1990  24.4  33.6  40.6  40.1  31.4  18.4  6.7  31.6  20.2 
SOCIAL  SECURITY  BENEFITS  (OASDI) 
1960  11.2  15.9  22.4  26.9  33.6  26.0  11.3  20.6  28.0 
1970  13.0  19.7  28.4  42.1  52.0  40.6  24.5  28.6  42.6 
1980  14.4  22.1  34.0  51.0  72.1  55.0  35.4  34.2  59.0 
1990  16.0  24.4  38.1  60.7  83.7  69.2  44.5  39.4  70.8 
HEALTH  BENEFITS  (Medicare  and  Medicaid) 
1960  10.8  10.3  9.4  8.6  6.4  3.4  1.2  8.9  4.0 
1970  16.7  18.4  18.1  17.5  17.5  14.2  9.9  17.2  14.8 
1980  22.8  26.4  30.2  31.7  33.0  27.3  19.9  27.4  28.3 
1990  30.8  35.3  43.2  52.6  59.0  49.0  34.4  41.3  50.4 
UELFARE  BENEFITS 
1960  6.6  5.7  4.4  3.0.  1.7  0.9  0.4  4.3  1.0 
1970  8.5  7.7  6.3  4.7  3.2  2.3  1.2  6.2  2.4 
1980  8.8  8.0  6.6  5.3  3.9  3.0  1.8  6.7  3.0 
1990  9.5  8.6  7.2  5.8  4.4  3.3  1.9  7.2  3.4 
Source:  Authors1 calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 3b 
The  Components  of Generational Accounts -- Female Cohorts  1960-90 
(Population Weighted  Averages  in Thousands  of  1992 Dollars) 
Age  Group:  20-29  30-39  40-49  50-59  60-69  70-79  80-89  20-89  65-89 
LABOR  INCOME  TAXES 
1960  17.5  13.9  10.9  6.4  1.8  0.3  0.1  9.9  0.5 
1970  28.7  21.5  15.2  8.6  2.5  0.3  0.1  15.0  0.6 
1980  38.0  32.9  21.8  10.6  2.7  0.4  0.1  21.4  0.7 
1990  44.7  40.7  30.5  14.6  3.3  0.6  0.2  26.8  0.8 
PAYROLL  TAXES 
1960  18.1  13.7  10.2  5.6  1.5  0.2  0.1  9.7  0.4 
1970  31.6  23.4  16.1  8.9  2.5  0.3  0.1  16.2  0.6 
1980  43.0  37.0  24.4  11.6  2.9  0.4  0.1  24.1  0.7 
1990  51.2  46.7  35.2  16.9  3.8  0.7  0.2  30.7  1.0 
INDIRECT  TAXES 
1960  44.7  41.8  34.4  24.6  14.7  8.3  4.3  31.3  9.2 
1970  48.8  47.6  40.0  30.3  19.9  11.4  6.6  35.8  12.5 
1980  50.4  50.4  43.1  33.2  23.5  14.5  8.6  38.7  15.2 
1990  56.0  56.2  49.0  37.8  26.7  16.9  9.8  43.6  17.4 
CAPITAL  INCOME  TAXES 
1960  19.9  27.7  32.1  31.2  23.5  12.6  7.3  25.5  14.8 
1970  19.2  28.4  32.9  30.7  24.7  15.7  7.8  25.3  16.6 
1980  21.7  29.6  36.2  34.6  25.6  16.9  12.3  27.0  17.8 
1990  26.7  34.6  39.1  37.6  28.1  13.3  3.5  30.0  14.6 
SOCIAL  SECURITY  BENEFITS  (OASDI) 
1960  11.2  16.5  24.6  33.0  36.5  22.3  7.6  22.5  24.9 
1970  12.4  19.4  29.3  44.8  57.2  40.9  22.2  30.5  42.5 
1980  13.5  21.0  33.4  52.0  71.9  57.0  34.7  35.5  57.1 
1990  14.9  22.9  36.3  59.6  82.9  68.8  45.3  40.2  67.9 
HEALTH  BENEFITS  (Medicare  and  Medicaid) 
1960  12.4  13.4  13.6  13.1  9.9  5.2  1.8  11.9  5.9 
1970  17.2  21.4  23.9  24.8  24.6  19.1  12.5  21.4  19.5 
1980  21.8  28.8  37.0  41.9  44.5  36.3  24.9  32.6  36.4 
1990  27.4  36.2  49.8  65.0  75.1  63.8  44.1  47.6  62.9 
WELFARE  BENEFITS 
1960  9.7  6.2  3.6  2.0  1.1  0.6  0.3  4.5  0.7 
1970  13.9  9.4  5.6  3.2  2.1  1.5  1.0  6.8  1.6 
1980  14.5  9.8  5.8  3.6  2.6  2.0  1.4  7.6  2.0 
1990  17.5  11.7  6.9  4.1  3.0  2.3  1.6  8.9  2.3 
Source:  Authorsr  calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 4a 
The  Composition  of  Total Resources 
Male  Cohorts  1960-90 
Age  Group:  20-29  30-39  40-49  50-59  60-69  70-79  80-89 
HUMAN  WEALTH 
NON-HUMAN  WEALTH 
PENSION  WEALTH 
GENERATIONAL  ACCOUNT 
Source:  Authorsr  calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 4b 
The  Composition of  Total  Resources 
Female Cohorts  1960-90 
Age  Group:  20-29  30-39  40-49  50-59  60-69  70-79  80-89 
HUMAN  WEALTH 
NOW-HUMAN  WEALTH 
PENSION  WEALTH 
GENERATIONAL  ACCOUNT 
Source:  Authors1  calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 5a 
The  Components  of  Generational Accounts  As  a  Share  of Total Resources 
Male Cohorts  1960-90 
Age  Group:  20-29  30-39  40-49  50-59  60-69  70-79  80-89  20-89  65-89 
LABOR  INCOME  TAXES 
1960  0.15  0.13  0.10  0.07  0.03  0.01  0.01  0.11  0.01 
1970  0.16  0.14  0.11  0.07  0.03  0.01  0.00  0.12  0.01 
1980  0.17  0.15  0.11  0.07  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.12  0.01 
1990  0.18  0.16  0.12  0.06  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.12  0.01 
PAYROLL  TAXES 
1960  0.12  0.10  0.07  0.05  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.08  0.01 
1970  0.16  0.13  0.09  0.06  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.11  0.01 
1980  0.19  0.15  0.11  0.07  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.12  0.01 
1990  0.20  0.17  0.12  0.07  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.13  0.01 
INDIRECT  TAXES 
1960  0.11  0.10  0.10  0.09  0.07  0.05  0.04  0.10  0.06 
1970  0.12  0.10  0.09  0.08  0.07  0.05  0.05  0.10  0.06 
1980  0.12  0.11  0.09  0.08  0.06  0.05  0.04  0.10  0.05 
1990  0.13  0.11  0.09  0.07  0.06  0.05  0.05  0.10  0.05 
CAPITAL  INCOME  TAXES 
1960  0.04  0.06  0.08  0.11  0.12  0.10  0.07  0.07  0.10 
1970  0.04  0.06  0.07  0.08  0.09  0.08  0.07  0.06  0.09 
1980  0.05  0.06  0.07  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.07  0.06  0.08 
1990  0.06  0.07  0.08  0.08  0.07  0.05  0.04  0.07  0.06 
SOCIAL  SECURITY  BENEFITS  (OASDI) 
1960  0.03  0.04  0.06  0.09  0.16  0.17  0.11  0.06  0.17 
1970  0.03  0.04  0.06  0.11  0.18  0.20  0.20  0.07  0.20 
1980  0.03  0.04  0.07  0.11  0.20  0.20  0.19  0.08  0.21 
1990  0.04  0.05  0.07  0.12  0.18  0.20  0.24  0.08  0.20 
HEALTH  BENEFITS  (Medicare  and  Medicaid) 
1960  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.01  0.03  0.02 
1970  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.07  0.08  0.04  0.07 
1980  0.05  0.05  0.06  0.07  0.09  0.10  0.11  0.06  0.10 
1990  0.07  0.07  0.08  0.10  0.13  0.14  0.19  0.09  0.14 
WELFARE  BENEFITS 
1960  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01 
1970  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01 
1980  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01 
1990  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01 
Source:  Authors1  calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 5b 
The  Components  of  Generational  Accounts  As  a  Share  of  Total  Resources 
Female  Cohorts  1960-90 
Age  Group:  20-29  30-39  40-49  50-59  60-69  70-79  80-89  20-89  65-89 
LABOR  INCOME  TAXES 
1960  0.18  0.12  0.07  0.04  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.08  0.00 
1970  0.18  0.13  0.08  0.04  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.08  0.00 
1980  0.19  0.14  0.08  0.04  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.09  0.00 
1990  0.18  0.14  0.09  0.04  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.09  0.00 
PAYROLL  TAXES 
1960  0.19  0.12  0.07  0.03  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.07  0.00 
1970  0.19  0.14  0.08  0.04  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.09  0.00 
1980  0.21  0.16  0.09  0.04  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.10  0.00 
1990  0.21  0.16  0.11  0.05  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.10  0.00 
INDIRECT  TAXES 
1960  0.46  0.37  0.22  0.14  0.10  0.07  0.05  0.24  0.08 
1970  0.30  0.28  0.20  0.14  0.09  0.07  0.08  0.19  0.08 
1980  0.25  0.21  0.16  0.11  0.08  0.06  0.05  0.16  0.07 
1990  0.23  0.19  0.15  0.11  0.07  0.06  0.08  0.15  0.06 
CAPITAL  INCOME  TAXES 
1960  0.21  0.25  0.21  0.18  0.16  0.11  0.08  0.19  0.12 
1970  0.12  0.17  0.16  0.14  0.11  0.10  0.09  0.14  0.10 
1980  0.11  0.12  0.13  0.12  0.09  0.07  0.07  0.11  0.08 
1990  0.11  0.12  0.12  0.11  0.08  0.05  0.03  0.10  0.05 
SOCIAL  SECURITY  BENEFITS  (OASDI) 
1960  0.12  0.15  0.16  0.19  0.25  0.19  0.08  0.17  0.21 
1970  0.08  0.11  0.15  0.20  0.26  0.25  0.27  0.16  0.26 
1980  0.07  0.09  0.12  0.18  0.26  0.25  0.21  0.15  0.25 
1990  0.06  0.08  0.11  0.17  0.23  0.25  0.35  0.14  0.25 
HEALTH  BENEFITS  (Medicare  and Medicaid) 
1960  0.13  0.12  0.09  0.08  0.07  0.04  0.02  0.09  0.05 
1970  0.11  0.12  0.12  0.11  0.11  0.12  0.15  0.12  0.12 
1980  0.11  0.12  0.13  0.14  0.16  0.16  0.15  0.13  0.16 
1990  0.11  0.13  0.15  0.19  0.21  0.23  0.34  0.16  0.23 
UELFARE  BENEFITS 
1960  0.10  0.06  0.02  0.04  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.03  0.01 
1970  0.08  0.05  0.03  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.04  0.01 
1980  0.07  0.04  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.03  0.01 
1990  0.07  0.04  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.03  0.01 
Source:  Authors1  calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 6a 
The  Components of Bequeathable  Resources -  Male Cohorts  1960-90 
(Population Weighted Averages  in  Thousands  of 1992  Dollars) 
Age  Group:  20-29  30-39  40-49  50-59  60-69  70-79  80-89  20-89  65-89 
TOTAL  RESOURCES 
NON-HUMAN  WEALTH 
TERM  VALUE  OF  LIFE  INSURANCE 
BEQUEATHABLE WEALTH  (Non-Human  Wealth  Plus Term  Value of Life 1  nsurance) 
ANNUITIZED  WEALTH  (Total Wealth Minus Bequeathable Wealth) 
Source:  Authors1  calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 6b 
The  Cunponents of  Bequeathable Resources -  Female Cohorts  1960-90 
(Population Weighted  Averages  in Thousands  of  1992 Dollars) 
Age  Group:  20-29  30-39  40-49  50-59  60-69  70-79  80-89  20-89  65-89 
TOTAL  RESOURCES 
NON-HUMAN  WEALTH 
TERM  VALUE  OF  LIFE  INSURANCE 
BEQUEATHABLE WEALTH  (Non-Hunan  Wealth  Plus  Term  Value of  Life Insurance) 
ANNUITIZED  WEALTH  (Total  Wealth  Minus  Bequeathable  Wealth) 
Source:  Authorsf  calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable  7a 
Bequeathable and Annuitired Resources As  a Share  of  Total  Resources 
Male Cohorts  1960-90 
Age  Group:  20-29  30-39  40-49  50-59  60-69  70-79  80-89  20-89  65-89 
TOTAL  RESWRCES 
NON-HUMAN  WEALTH 
TERM  VALUE  OF  LIFE  INSURANCE 
BEQUEATHABLE  WEALTH  (Non-Human  Wea  1  th P Lus  Term  Value  of  Life Insurance) 
ANNUITIZED  WEALTH  (Total  Wealth Minus Bequeathable Wealth) 
Source:  Authors1 calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 7b 
Bequeathable  and Annuitized Resources As  a  Share  of Total Resources 
Female Cohorts 1960-90 
Age  Group:  20-29  30-39  40-49  50-59  60-69  70-79  80-89  20-89  65-89 
TOTAL  RESOURCES 
NON-HUMAN  WEALTH 
TERM  VALUE  OF  LIFE  INSURANCE 
BEQUEATHABLE WEALTH  (Non-Human  Wealth  P Lus  Term  Value of Life Insurance) 
ANNUITIZED  WEALTH  (Total  Wealth  Minus Bequeathable Wealth) 
Source:  Authors1  calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 8 
Males 
Fema 1  es 
Ratio of  Annuitized  to Total  Resources under  Different 
Interest Rate  (r) Assunptions 
Source:  Authors1 calculations 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmYear 
Fema 1  es 
Table 9 
Ratios of Annuitized  to Total  Resources under 
Alternative Health Care  Spending Outcomes 
Base  Case  Clinton Health  Health Reform  Stabilizing 
Reform  Uith 2% Faster  Health Care 
Cost  Grouth  Spending  after 
1994 
Source:  Authors1 calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable  10 
Annual  Bequest  Flow  in 1990  Based  upon  Annui tization Ratios  for  1990  and  1960 
Alternative Health Care  Spending Outcanes 
(Billions of  1992  Dollars) 
Year  Base  Case  Clinton Health  Health Reform  Stabilizing 
Reform  Uith 2% Faster  Health Care 
Cost  Growth  Spending after 
1994 
1960  360.8  356.6  357.2  345.4 
ratio 
1990 
ratio  245.1  245.1  245.1  245.1 
percent 
difference  47.2  45.5  45.8  40.9 
Source:  Authors1 calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable  11 
Annual  1990  Bequest  Flow  Based upon Annui tization Ratios for 1990  and  1960 
Alternative  Interest Rate  (r) Assunptions 




ratio  381  .O  360.8  345.0 
1990 
ratio  245.1  245.1  245.1 
percent 
difference  55.5 
Source:  Authors1  calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm